tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7875069982976812251.post9172289915398349429..comments2023-10-17T04:51:08.765-10:00Comments on KauaiEclectic: Musings: Down for the CountJoan Conrowhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00172330100788007499noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7875069982976812251.post-43463675741693507962007-12-16T13:19:00.000-10:002007-12-16T13:19:00.000-10:00How can a law that everyone admits is specially wr...How can a law that everyone admits is specially written to apply only the the SF be a general law?<BR/><BR/>The best way to answer is by looking at another Hawaii case that dealt with the same issue. Bulgo v. Maui County, 430 P.2d 321, 50 Hawai'i 51 (1967). Back in 1966, Eddie Tam,who had been re-elected to the Maui board of supervisors, died before the beginning of the term. The board asked the state legislature to provide legislation allowing a special election to replace Tam.<BR/><BR/>The legislature obliged with a law that said in part, "The governor shall issue a proclamation within ten days after the approval of this Act requiring special elections to be held if any person elected in the general election of 1966 to the office of chairman of the board of supervisors of a county died before January 2, 1967..."<BR/><BR/>At the time of approval of the Act, the county of Maui was the only county in which the person elected as county chairman in the 1966 general election had died before January 2, 1967 and it was patently obvious and freely admitted that the act was specially written to address this particular situation. Furthermore, because of the explicitly defined period of time covered by the law, its terms would never cover any other situations in the future.<BR/><BR/>In ruling that that law was general legislation and therefore constitutional, the Hawaii Supreme Court said, "The challenged provision does not give the county of Maui any power which is different from that which the Act gives to the counties of Hawaii and Kauai. It neither favors nor discriminates against Maui. The contingency contemplated in the Act now exists on Maui. The provision brings Maui within the scope of the Act in the present situation."<BR/><BR/>The court made clear that it is legally irrelevant whether a law's intent or practical effect is to address a specific situation. I can understand how the legal distinction between general and special laws might be counter-intuitive, or seem to depend too much on artfull drafting. But the point of guarding against special legislation is not to prevent the legislature from dealing with specific situations, or even helping specific companies (look, for instance, at special tax incentives to entice a company to, say, build a factory in a state). Rather it is to prevent discrimination between members of a class. <BR/><BR/>If the intent of Act 2 was to exclude another ferry company from competing with SF, Maui Tomorrow would have a case. As it stands, they don't.Charley Fosterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14139873035556682347noreply@blogger.com